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Introduction  
There is a perceived legitimacy deficit in the ordering structure of international society. A 
symptom of this is the political fallout surrounding the 2011 Libyan crisis and its influence on 
the 2011-3 Syrian crisis.1  This involved criticism being levelled at the coalition led by the so-
called Permanent-3 (P3 or France, the UK and US) for the way they implemented the protection 
of civilians (POC) mandate contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), as well as 
for the referral of the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Resolution 
1970 (2011). The coalition intervening to implement Resolution 1973 was accused by the BRICS 
states of exceeding the POC mandate and pursuing regime change; and the Security Council’s 
decision to refer the situation to the ICC, and to not defer the subsequent indictments, was 
considered by African states to be imprudent and irresponsible.   
These arguments were not the only indicators of a perceived legitimacy deficit.  In many respects 
they built on previous frustrations with the P3’s interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), which includes the responsibility to prosecute, and they have influenced post-Libya 
international relations, especially with regard to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.2  How the P3 
respond to these developments will be driven in part by how this ‘legitimacy fault line’ is 
interpreted.3  The purpose of this paper is to first give an interpretation that is informed by the 
                                                          
1 ‘[O]ne of its [legitimacy deficit’s] distinctive symptoms will be fundamental contestation between different groups 
of intellectuals’ David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), p.76. 
2 The responsibility to prosecute is implicit in the Responsibility to Protect concept. See Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon’s Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 12 January 2009, p.11 at 
http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/CivPro_R2PUNReport.pdf I am grateful to Adrian Gallagher 
for this point. 
3 Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Introduction’, in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds.) Faultlines of International 
Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.1-16.  Following Coicaud we do not believe the use of 
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work of contemporary English School scholars and the political theorists they draw on; and 
second to provide the context in which specific policy recommendations may guide the response 
of the P3 states.             
We argue that because the new legitimacy fault line divides on the procedural question of who 
decides how international society should meet its responsibilities rather than substantive 
disagreements about what those responsibilities are (i.e. human protection and criminal justice) 
the challenge to the liberal agenda of the P3 is not radical.  However, we also argue that ignoring 
the procedural concerns of the African and BRICS states is not outcome neutral and could in 
fact do harm to both the ICC and the wider implementation of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).  This is because liberal hegemony, which has never been powerful enough to end mass 
atrocity, is now even less effective.  In an age where the capacity and willingness of the P3 states 
to intervene is less, the relative importance of non-P3 states to securing effective humanitarian 
outcomes increases.  Including the views of non-P3 states in the decision-making on when and 
how international society should intervene in the affairs of national societies is thus not simply a 
matter of representation (or input-legitimacy); it is also increasingly a matter or effectiveness (or 
output legitimacy).4  The term ‘including’ can mean many things here, from making sure the 
Security Council is given the opportunity to consider and vote on R2P matters, to improving the 
representation at the Security Council of those with a particular stake in the implementation of 
R2P (notably the African states).  Arguments for improving the representativeness of 
international decision-making can be (and have been) made by cosmopolitan theorists on purely 
normative grounds.5  The argument here is that there are also pragmatic reasons why the P3 
states committed to R2P would want to support more representative decision-making 
procedures at the UN Security Council. 
To advance this argument the paper is structured in four parts.  The first discusses the concept 
of international legitimacy as a means of interpreting the current divide in international society.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the term ‘legitimacy crisis’ is appropriate in this instance. If legitimacy crises are defined, in Christian Reus-Smit’s 
words, as ‘critical turning points in which the imperative to adapt is heightened by the imminent possibility of death, 
collapse, demise, disempowerment, or decline into irrelevance’, then we do not think an international society that 
upholds a responsibility to protect and prosecute is at that point.  See Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of 
Legitimacy’, International Politics, 44 (2007) p.166-7. Quoted in Coicaud, ‘Introduction’, p.4.  However, we do argue in 
this paper that there is a perceived legitimacy deficit, which is making it more difficult for international society to 
meet its responsibilities. We also argue that ‘adaptation’ is necessary in order to pre-empt a crisis and that a better 
understanding of the ‘interpretive arguments’ that constitute the current faultline will assist that process.   The 
phrase ‘interpretive arguments’ is Reus-Smit’s ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, p.172. 
4 On ‘input’ and ‘output legitimacy’ see Fritz Scharpf Governing Europe. Effective and Democratic (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 1999), cited in Andrew Hurrell, ‘Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?’, Review 
of International Studies 31 special issue (2005), p.16. 
5 See for example David Held, Democracy and Global Order. From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1995. 
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Drawing on the work of contemporary English School writers it notes a theoretical divide in 
what legitimacy means in international society.  The division rests on the relative value given to 
representative procedures on the one hand and substantive outcomes on the other.  This 
theoretical divide it is argued can help interpret current policy divisions.  The section also 
assesses the argument that underpins hierarchical conceptions of the liberal order.  This insists 
that by limiting decision-making authority to a narrow band of (liberal) states international 
society is more likely to deliver substantively liberal outcomes. Such an argument is not only 
vulnerable to the charge of being undemocratic (and thus, in a liberal context, hypocritical) it also 
places a heavy burden on hegemonic decision-makers (for instance the P3) to deliver 
substantively liberal outcomes.  An inability or unwillingness to deliver in this regard means the 
hierarchical model is failing on its own terms and can more easily be considered illegitimate.   
The second and third sections interpret the contemporary situation through this theoretical lens.  
The second notes how frustration with the Security Council’s use of its power to refer and defer 
situations to the ICC has contributed to a policy of non-cooperation among certain African 
states.  This has exacerbated the Court’s problem of bringing the accused to justice and provides 
an example of how a sense of exclusion from decision-making has a negative impact on the 
delivery of liberal outcomes.  There are similar, although less clear cut, consequences for the 
protection of civilian populations.  Section three notes how the accusation that the P3 abused 
the legal mandate during the Libya operation contributed to the confused and ineffective 
international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.  This too provides an example of how 
the failure to maintain an international consensus can have a negative impact on the delivery of 
liberal outcomes.  In this context, the final section considers two proposals for procedural 
reform and examines how the P3 response to these would impact on their claims to be good 
international citizens. 
    
Legitimacy in international society  
Hedley Bull famously argued that international society exists when ‘a group of states, conscious 
of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share 
in their working of common institutions’.6  The most important aspect of this definition for Ian 
Clark is the sense among states that they were somehow ‘bound’ by these rules (or norms) and 
‘obliged’ to work through common institutions.  It is not the norms themselves that constitute 
                                                          
6 Bull (1977: 13) 
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international society but a belief that they are legitimate and should be observed.7  This is echoed 
by Andrew Hurrell who notes that legitimacy ‘implies a willingness to comply with rules, or 
accept a political order, even if this goes against specific interests at specific times’.8 Likewise, 
Christian Reus-Smit argues that legitimacy facilitates ‘voluntary compliance.  This is the 
compliance that actors give when they believe a rule, decision, or command is rightful, even if it 
contradicts their narrow self-interests.’9  
It follows that those international norms, rules and decisions that lack legitimacy have less of a 
binding quality.  State behaviour in these situations may still be consistent with international 
norms, rules and decisions but its reasons for doing so are more likely to be strategic than 
normative.10  In other words, norm-compliance occurs in this instance because it is in the state’s 
particular interest rather than because it is deemed appropriate in all circumstances; and of 
course those interests can be manipulated, and norm compliance coerced, by hegemonic states.  
This does not mean legitimacy is not a consideration of either the hegemonic or the subordinate 
state.  The hegemon can limit the political costs it has to bear during this process if it can 
encourage ‘followership’ by convincing other states of the legitimacy of the norm it supports.11  
Reus-Smit again articulates this when he writes that actors who command legitimacy ‘can benefit 
from low levels of opposition, which reduces the costs of coercion and bribery’.12 In a more 
positive vein, legitimate actors ‘can draw on the active support of other actors who do more than 
simply comply with their decisions, actively investing their resources and energies in the project 
that lies behind them.’13 
What then is legitimacy in the context of international society and how does it help interpret the 
current impasse over R2P?  English School writers identify substantive and procedural elements 
                                                          
7 Clark (2005: 23) 
8 Hurrell (2007, 78); See also Andrew Hurrell, ‘Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?’, Review of 
International Studies 31 special issue (2005), p.16; see also Beetham 1991, p.26. ‘The legitimacy or rightfulness of 
power, then, provides an explanation for obedience through the obligations it imposes on people to obey, and 
through the grounds or reasons it gives for their obedience’. 
9 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p.163. 
10 As Beetham 1991 pp.27-8 puts it ‘Obedience is therefore to be explained by a complex of reasons, moral as well 
as prudential, normative as well as self-interested, that legitimate power provides for those who are subject to it.’ 
11 ‘Followership’ is Hurrell’s term.  As Beetham notes, the ‘realist’ approach, ‘which holds that obedience is only a 
matter of the resources available to the powerful to ensure compliance with their wishes, and that legitimacy is 
irrelevant’ forgets that ‘people relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as self-interested actors’ and that power 
does not necessarily collapse when legitimacy is eroded but coercion does, in this situation, have to be much more 
extensive and omnipresent, and that is costly to maintain’.  Indeed, Reus-Smit notes that IR scholars ‘have 
frequently argued that the critical difference [between] a dominant state and a hegemon is that the latter’s power 
rests as much on legitimacy as material resources, and … it is this quality of legitimacy that makes hegemony, and nt 
domination, conducive to the stability of an international order.’ Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, 
p.170. 
12 Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p.164 
13 Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p.163 
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in their definitions of international legitimacy.14  The best way to understand this distinction is to 
recall the difference between natural and positive law.  The authority of the former stems from it 
being an articulation of right and wrong that is external to, and not contingent on, the political 
bargaining of sovereign and self-interested states.  It rests on a consensus that is ‘teased out’ 
through the exercise of right reason, finds expression in the legal doctrine of jus cogens and does 
not require the consent of states to be considered binding.15  The authority of the latter, on the 
hand, stems from the view that there is no right or wrong beyond which states have consented 
to through treaty law.  In the context of contemporary international society states are bound by 
laws that accord with the procedures specified by the United Nations Charter, including 
conferring primary responsibility for international peace and security on the Security Council, 
because they have, by virtue of their membership of that organisation, consented to be so 
bound.16  From the proceduralist perspective of international legitimacy states are bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions regardless of their moral content. This poses a problem to those 
who hold a substantive view of legitimacy because from that perspective the Security Council 
can still make unreasonable decisions even when it follows the letter of the law.17 
Despite the implication that natural law has an unalterable quality to it, substantive views of 
legitimacy have of course varied over time. After all, the ‘Aristotelian version of natural law 
justified slavery as well as aristocracy, while most Enlightenment versions postulated a radical 
difference between the nature of men and women’.18  What we are interested in here is the view 
that the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes is now jus cogens and that 
international society must do more to enforce that.  It is this that underpins the R2P narrative.  
R2P emerged from the commonly held view that the society of states and its governing 
institutions, most notably the UN Security Council, were failing to respond to a growing 
cosmopolitan consciousness that mass atrocity crimes had to be prevented.19   
                                                          
14 David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, ‘Force and Legitimacy in World Politics’, Review of International Studies 31, 
special issue (2005); p.5; Hurrell, … Clark … Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p.170 
15 (Clark 2005: 198). Hurrell 2008, 83. Ralph, 2007, 55-86. 
16 ‘It is upon the UNSC that “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations’, the 
organization’s 191 members “confer … primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” (Article 24), and in so doing “agree to accept and carry out [its] decisions … in accordance with the present 
Charter’ (Article 25). Justin Morris and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Security Council’s Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use 
of Force’, International Politics 44 2007 215. 
17 Morris and Wheeler, ‘The Security Council’s Crisis’, p.44. On the distinction between the ‘source’ and ‘content’ of 
rules, see Beetham (1991) p.70, see also Norman Geras, ‘Intervention in Syria and UN authorization’, 1  September 
2013 at http://normblog.typepad.com/ 
18 Beetham, 1991, p.73 
19 Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect. Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, 29-56. 
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Yet what we have seen with the ratification and acceptance of the 1998 Rome Statute, and the 
adoption 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, is that this shift in the substantive values 
international society is supposed to reflect has not led to a radical shift in the legal procedures 
that structure the way in which it responds when those values are challenged. While the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) relayed ‘two important 
messages’ concerning the credibility of the Security Council should it continue to fail 
international society, the World Summit Outcome Document did nothing to change the structure of 
international law.  Paragraph 139 stated that international society was ‘prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation …’.20  In giving the Prosecutor 
proprio motu powers to investigate without Security Council authorisation, the Rome Statute went 
further in challenging the primary responsibility of the Security Council.21  Yet, even here the 
Statute reflected the ‘counter-revolution’ that some states, notably the US, launched with a view 
to defending the primacy of the Security Council.  Article 16 of the Statute, for instance, enables 
the Security Council to defer investigations if it considers the judicial process to be a threat to 
international peace and security; and article 12 enables the Security Council to refer situations to 
the Court even if those involve states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.22  In this respect 
R2P, including the responsibility to prosecute, remains vulnerable to the familiar charge that 
international society is hierarchical, unrepresentative and unresponsive to its constituents.  One 
might expect this charge to resonate more loudly because R2P reflects a more ambitious and 
more intrusive conception of international society. 
This should be of particular concern for an advocate of liberal international society given the 
place representation has in that value-scheme.  Christian Reus-Smit’s critique of ‘liberal 
hierarchy’ is relevant here.  The targets of Reus-Smit’s criticism were those pushing the idea that 
force could be legitimised by a ‘community of democracies’, which was said to exist outside of 
(and in competition to) the authority of the UN Security Council.  For Reus-Smit proponents of 
this kind of liberal hierarchy ‘contradict the foundational tenets of liberalism by promoting a 
reconjoining of right and might’.23  His defence of what he calls the ‘equalitarian regime’ 
articulated in the UN Charter was thus a matter of liberal principle. It was complemented by 
practical considerations (i.e. the lack of an institutionalised community of democracies) and by 
prudential concerns (i.e. the potential to trigger revisionism among non-liberal states). This does 
                                                          
20 Hehir, Responsibility to Protect 75-6. 
21 Ralph, Defending the Society of States, 96-109. 
22 Ralph, Defending the Society of States 109-117. 
23 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal hierarchy and the license to use force’, Review of International Studies 31 special issue 
2005, p.90. 
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not mean the UN system is unproblematic.  As Reus-Smit acknowledges, those elements of 
hierarchy that exist within the UN system can cause similar problems, although to a lesser 
degree.   
While the equalitarian regime constitutes the institutional bedrock of present 
international society, peaks of institutional hierarchy punctuate the horizon, and 
each of these peaks has become a focal point of disenchantment and contestation.  
The Permanent Five and their veto power in the Security Council is one such peak, 
an understandable gesture to the realities of post-1945 power, and for most of its 
history a near guarantee of institutional politicisation and paralysis.24 
Together with weighted voting rights in international financial institutions and differential rights 
and obligations contained within the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the institutionalised 
hierarchy contained within the UN system is one of ‘the principal points of institutional 
contestation in the present international system’.  It has not, he concludes, achieved anything like 
a governance equilibrium’.25 
There are two points to draw from this.  First, when the P3 act through the Security Council they 
are by no means certain of persuading others to follow because the Security Council itself might 
be considered an illegitimate institution; and second, the P3 are even less likely to encourage 
followership when they act outside the Security Council because this increases legitimacy costs.  
A response to this might be to downplay the relative importance of representativeness to 
legitimacy claims.  It does not matter, from this perspective, that the Security Council is not 
representative and that the P3 acting by independently lack even less of a mandate to speak for 
international society.  The key point is that they can mobilise sufficient political resources 
(including military power) to deliver outcomes that are substantively just.  The exclusionary 
nature of the decision-making can, in other words, be justified by the claim that it serves 
common interests or and/or common values.26  Andrew Hurrell describes this in the context of 
the focus on the Security Council  
even if we continue to think that institutions and international law matter, we still 
need to place great weight on the relationship between the legal and political order.  
Thus, those who reject calls for a reform and expansion of the permanent 
membership of the Security Council often rest their arguments on the importance of 
effectiveness.  Yes, reform might promote representation, but at what cost? If a 
Council of 25 or 26 is even less able to effectively than the current arrangement, then 
how has this increased the legitimacy of the organization? 27 
He adds that it is  
                                                          
24 Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal hierarchy’, p.88. 
25 Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal hierarchy’, p.88. 
26 Beetham, 1991, 82. 
27 Hurrell, p.87. 
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this line of argument that is central to those who are tempted by the possibilities of 
a power-political order built around empire and hegemony – the idea of an 
American Empire as the only possible provider of global security and other 
international public goods, as the only state with the capacity to undertake the 
interventionist and state-building tasks that the changing character of security has 
rendered so vital, and as the essential power-political pivot for the expansion of 
global liberalism.28 
One does not have to make a normative judgment on the relative value of the procedural and 
substantive components of legitimacy to recognise the immense burden this places on the liberal 
hegemon.  This is especially so when the ambitions of international society have increased from 
maintaining international peace and security, to protecting civilian populations from mass atrocity 
and prosecuting the perpetrators of such crimes.  What is more, the failure to deliver effective 
outcomes in these areas robs the hegemon of the argument that can justify the hierarchical 
decision making process.  The legitimacy deficit, which already exists on grounds that the 
decision-making process is unrepresentative, increases.  This does not necessarily lead to the 
collapse of the liberal order, but it makes the realisation of its ideals harder.  David Beetham 
describes this process: 
The collapse of authority where the legitimacy is eroded, and coercive force is 
insufficient to maintain power on its own, provides only the most dramatic evidence 
for the significance of legitimacy to the obedience of subordinates.  Less dramatic, 
but equally important, is the effect a lack of legitimacy has on the degree of 
cooperation, and the quality of performance, that can be secured from them, and 
therefore on the ability of the powerful to achieve goals other than simply the 
maintenance of their position.29  
The hegemon can find itself in something of a catch-22 in this respect. It risks losing the 
authority to do what is substantively right if it democratises the decision-making process but if it 
does not democratise the decision-making process it risks exhausting itself, losing the capacity 
and/or will to do what is substantively right, which in turn increases the pressure to democratise 
the decision-making process .  Again the increased ambitions of international society reflected by 
R2P are important here.  The main focus of R2P, including the work of the ICC has been on 
Africa, which makes it an important ‘social constituency of legitimation’.30  Of course, this 
continent is not represented among the permanent members of the Security Council and until 
relatively recently it was in a subordinate position to the European members of the P3, which was 
                                                          
28 Hurrell, p.? 
29 Beetham, 1991, p.28  Beetham goes on to note if the quality of subordinate performance is not an issue for power 
holders then legitimacy concerns will be less pressing. So, ‘the quality of performance needed from the subordinate 
party in a relationship, and the degree of legitimacy the relationship requires, are closely connected’ (pp.31-32) 
30 Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p.164 ‘Where one needs legitimacy will depend … upon where one 
seeks to act, and the relevant constituency will be determined by the realm of political action.  We know all too well, 
though that a disjuncture often exists between an actor’s realm of political action and the community in which they 
actually command legitimacy, deliberately or otherwise. I shall term this community “the social constituency of 
legitimation”, the actual social grouping in which legitimacy is sought, ordained, or both.’ 
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of course formalised by colonial institutions.  A continuing sense of exclusion in this sense can, 
following Beetham, ‘influence the degree of cooperation’ and with it ‘the quality of performance’ of 
the liberal hegemon (i.e. the P3).31  Informed by this insight, the following sections highlight the 
legitimacy faultlines surrounding R2P, including the responsibility to prosecute.  They also assess 
the impact the perceived legitimacy deficit is having on its implementation of R2P.   
 
Legitimacy faultlines and the ICC in Africa    
This section advances the central argument by firstly describing why certain African states are 
disenchanted with the ICC’s activity and why that frustration has focused on the place the 
Security Council has in the international criminal process.  It then explains how the sense of 
being excluded from that process is, to paraphrase Beetham, affecting the degree of cooperation 
in international society and the quality of its performance in ending impunity.  It starts by 
describing the fallout from the UN Security Council referral of the situation in Libya. Yet it is 
apparent that this was symptomatic of a deeper unease about the Court and its relationship to the 
hierarchical structures of international society. 
On 26 February 2011 the Security Council passed resolution 1970, which amongst other things 
referred the Libyan situation to the ICC.  Libya was not a state party to the Rome Treaty but 
under Article 13 of the Statute the UN Security Council could refer situations involving such 
states.  This is despite the fact that three of the permanent members (the US, Russia and China) 
are themselves not party to the Rome Treaty.  Moreover, there is no requirement that states 
serving as elected members to the Security Council be parties to the Rome Statute.32  Taking up 
the referral, the Court issued three arrest warrants on 27 June 2011. These were for Muammar 
Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the head of Military Intelligence Abdullah al-Senussi.  
While the P-3 welcomed the Court’s move, others complained. For instance, South Africa’s 
President Jacob Zuma, despite voting for Resolution 1970, expressed his ‘extreme 
disappointment’ with the ICC’s decision. This was in part a response to domestic considerations.  
The increasingly powerful ANC Youth League had made clear its opposition to the President’s 
decision to support external intervention, calling it an imperial invasion by neo-colonial forces.33 
But it was also an expression of frustration at the timing of the Court’s statement.  Since its 
meeting of the Peace and Security Council on 10 March, the African Union (AU) had been 
working to end the violence in Libya through negotiation.  The arrest warrants were issued a day 
                                                          
31 Of the 10 elected members two (Lebanon and India) were not party to the Rome Treaty. 
32 Of the non-permanent members on the March 2011 Security Council ? were parties to the Rome Treaty.  
33 (Louw: 2011, 5-6).   
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after Zuma reported ‘major breakthroughs’ to the AU ad hoc committee in Pretoria.  Gaddafi 
had reportedly accepted the AU’s roadmap on Libya and had agreed to stay out of peace talks.34  
In response to the Court’s decision, the AU Assembly, which met in Malabo, Equitorial Guinea 
at the end of June, expressed its ‘deep concern’ at the manner in which the ICC Prosecutor had 
handled the situation in Libya.  It further noted that the warrant of arrest concerning Colonel 
Gaddafi seriously complicated the efforts aimed at finding a negotiated political solution to the 
crisis in Libya, ‘which will also address, in a mutually-reinforcing way, issues relating to impunity 
and reconciliation’.  It requested that the UN Security Council ‘activate the provisions of Article 
16 of the Rome Statute with a view to deferring the ICC process on Libya, in the interest of 
Justice as well as peace in the country’; and decided that its member states would ‘not cooperate 
in the execution of the arrest warrant’.35  Of course, this specific issue was overtaken by events.  
Gaddafi’s death the following October removed that particular case from the Court’s business; 
and with the victory of the NTC the AU position on Libya changed from one of non-
cooperation to an endorsement of ‘Libya’s request to put on trial in Libya its own citizens 
charged with committing international crimes’.36  
The 2011 statement of non-cooperation did not therefore impact on the task of bringing Saif Al-
Islam Gadaffi and Abdullah al-Senussi to justice. It is significant, however, because it illustrates 
the dissatisfaction among African states at what they see as the exclusions contained within the 
procedures that determine when and where international criminal justice is applied. It also 
illustrates how responses to these exclusions have impacted on the Court’s effectiveness.  
Indeed, the statement of non-cooperation on the Libyan referral extended the AU’s approach to 
another ICC arrest warrant, specifically the one issued for President Bashir of Sudan. This 
warrant also followed a Security Council referral – Resolution 1593 was passed in March 2005 - 
and it too had been the cause of much frustration for the AU.  It had for many years prior to the 
referral been engaged with Sudanese authorities in a mediation process aimed at finding a 
political solution to the Darfur crisis.37  Yet its initial calls for an Article 16 deferral were ignored 
by the Security Council and the non-cooperative stance first became AU policy in July 2009. In 
addition to calling for a deferral of the Libyan cases, therefore, the 2011 statement of the AU 
Assembly reiterated ‘the need to pursue all efforts and explore ways and means of ensuring that 
the request by the AU to the UN Security to defer the proceedings initiated against President 
Bashir of The Sudan, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute... be acted upon’. It also 
                                                          
34 (Louw: 2011, 5).   
35 (African Union 2011).   
36 (African Union 2012).   
37  (Jalloh, Akande, du Plessis: 2011, 7-8; 22-6; see also Mills, 2012). 
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requested a deferral of the investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 2008 post-election 
violence in Kenya (African Union 2011). 
The AU’s position on the Libya may not have had a significant effect on the Court’s work, but 
the same cannot be said for the Bashir case. Bashir has reportedly travelled to Chad, China, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Kenya and Libya without being arrested. Instead of condemning the 
African states in this list for a failure to meet their obligations, the AU has instead insisted that 
by receiving President Bashir, these states ‘were discharging their obligations under Article 23 of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union ... as well as acting in pursuit of peace and stability in 
their respective regions’.38  This is potentially major obstacle to implementing R2P.  The nature 
of the AU’s opposition to the Court, however, should be clear.  It does not oppose the practice 
of international criminal justice per se.  Indeed, the Assembly reiterates its commitment to fight 
impunity in conformity with the provisions of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union. Rather the source of the AU’s opposition is the refusal of the Security Council to listen 
to its demands that the investigations into African crimes be deferred because of the damage 
they are doing to the political efforts to create peace and security. The Court’s legitimacy is being 
called into question for procedural rather than substantive reasons. More specifically, it is the 
Court’s relationship to the Security Council and the African exclusion from the latter that is the 
main source of contestation.  
This was articulated nicely by Charles Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis  
From the perspective of many African leaders the ICC's involvement ... has come to 
reflect their central concern about the UN - the skewed nature of power distribution 
within the UNSC and global politics. Because of the Council's legitimacy deficit, 
many African and other developing countries see its work as "a cynical exercise of 
authority by great powers," in particular, the five permanent members ... And the 
result for the world's first permanent international penal court? The result is that the 
uneven political landscape of the post-World War II collective security regime has 
become a central problem of the ICC.  ... A failure to engage and assuage the African 
government concerns about the deferral provision could further damage the 
credibility of the ICC in Africa.39 
There is another part to this aspect of the Court’s legitimacy deficit. The sense of exclusion 
among African states is exacerbated by two instances where the Security Council appears to have 
                                                          
38 (African Union 2011).   
39 (2011, 9-11).   
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been responsive to the unreasonable requests of its permanent members. The first of these is the 
invocation of Article 16 to provide blanket immunity for US peacekeepers serving in Bosnia.  
This occurred in the early years of the Court’s jurisdiction and at the height of US animosity to 
the Court.  While it was argued that the threat of US withdrawal from Bosnia was a threat to 
peace and security which justified the Council’s intervention, many, including Kofi Annan, 
insisted that Article 16 was meant for a completely different scenario.  It was not envisaged at 
Rome that the Security Council could under this provision provide blanket immunity.40  The 
second instance involved the Security Council practice of tailoring referral resolutions in ways 
that excluded the citizens of non-party states.  This was the case in Resolution 1593 (2005) on 
Sudan and it was repeated in Resolution 1970 (2011) on Libya.  Such moves contradict ‘one of 
the key aims of the international criminal justice project and one of the ICC’s primary goals: the 
achievement of universal jurisdiction’.41  More than that, this kind of practice has legitimacy costs 
that are not, politically speaking, insignificant.  Again Jalloh, Akande, du Plessis articulate this 
point well.  A responsiveness to the concerns of the great powers has fuelled ‘the African 
perception that the Council – by bowing to the demands of its influential members even in the 
face of serious opposition by many other states - is guilty of double-standards given its refusal to 
endorse the AU's deferral request’.42  
There is an argument associated with liberal constructivism that the identification of double-
standards has normative power. That is liberal states could, in this instance, be shamed into 
reforming the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council simply by identifying 
the hypocrisy of double-standards.43  But hierarchy is based on double-standards and can, as 
noted, reduce the significance of this particular legitimacy cost by effectively delivering outcomes 
that protect international society’s substantive values.  In short, if the ICC as it is presently 
constituted can demonstrate advances in ending the culture of impunity for mass atrocity crimes 
then that could compensate for the procedural legitimacy deficit and justify the role that the 
Security Council is currently playing.  From this perspective it is not the identification of double-
standards that has the normative power to trigger international reform.  That normative power 
                                                          
40 Ralph 2007, 163-6; Jalloh et.al. 2011, 16-21. 
41 (Kersten: 2011, 7) Resolution 1970’s referral was limited to events after 15 February 2011.  Kersten (2013) 
suggests that this may have been included ‘in order to shield key Western states from having their affairs and 
relations with Libya investigated’.  
42 Jalloh, Akande, du Plessis (2011, 12). The perception of double-standards is felt most strongly in Africa of course, 
but it has not gone unnoticed outside that continent.  Commenting on the adoption of Resolution 1970, for instance, 
Brazil noted how it was ‘a long-standing supporter of the integrity and universalization of the Rome Statute, and 
opposed the exemption from jurisdiction of nationals of those countries not parties to it.  Brazil, therefore, 
expressed its strong reservation to the resolution’s operative paragraph 6, and reiterated its firm conviction that 
initiatives aimed at establishing those exemptions were not helpful to advance the cause of justice and accountability’ 
(quoted in Kersten: 2011, 7). 
43 See for instance chapters by Gurrowitz, Lynch and Sikkink in Price 2008. 
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comes from what those double-standards mean for the protection and promotion of 
international society’s substantive values.  If double-standards are an obstacle to progress in this 
respect then the pressure to reform the procedural aspects of R2P will increase.  The argument 
advanced in this section is that the legitimacy deficit that accrues from excluding significant parts 
of the Security Council’s social constituency is exacerbated by the ICC’s lack of progress in 
ending the culture of impunity; and that in turn increases pressure on the P3 to democratise the 
decision making process.     
 
Legitimacy faultlines and the protection of civilians after Libya 
This section advances the central argument by firstly describing the international reaction to the 
P3-led military intervention in the 2011 Libyan conflict.  In so doing it illustrates a different 
aspect of the legitimacy faultline on R2P.  It is argued that this schism centres on the procedural 
questions about who should decide how to implement R2P rather than substantive questions 
concerning the value of protecting civilians.  Indeed, many saw Security Council Resolution 1973, 
which authorized the use of all necessary means to protect the civilian population after reminding 
Libya of its responsibility in this area, as the moment R2P ‘came of age’.44 Although the Security 
Council vote was not unanimous (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany abstained) its 
approval indicates that R2P principles are not intolerable to the major (and emerging) powers.45 
 As the military mission to protect Libya’s civilian population progressed, however, these powers 
expressed concern that the P3 were abusing that mandate to pursue their particular goal of 
regime change.  In essence, this was a debate about how to effectively protect civilians.  Where 
the P3 argued that the POC mission would be compromised if it was too concerned about 
regime change being consequence, their opponents (spurred on by the BRICS) argued that the P3 
were at best unresponsive to the concerns of wider international society and could have 
implemented the POC mandate while avoiding regime change.   
                                                          
44 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’ Came of Age in 2011’. Address to the Stanley 
Foundation Conference. SG/SM/14068 18 January 2012 at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14068.doc.htm. See also his declaration that that ‘[b]y now it 
should be clear to all that the Responsibility to Protect has arrived’ Ki-moon, Ban (2011) ‘Remarks at Breakfast 
Roundtable with Foreign Ministers on “The Responsibility to Protect: Responding to Imminent Threats of Mass 
Atrocities”’, UN News Centre, 23 September, at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1325. Academics opinion echoed this.  
Tom Weiss (2011: 1, 5) noted how Libya ‘put teeth in the fledgling RtoP doctrine’, suggesting ‘that we can say no 
more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas – and occasionally mean it’.  Catherine Powell (2012) called Libya ‘a 
multilateral constitutional moment’.  
45 As Alex Bellamy (2011: 1) put it: ‘[w]here it was once a term of art employed by a handful of like-minded 
countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with suspicion by much of the rest of the world, RtoP has become a 
commonly accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities’. 
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The fallout from this is important for understanding the Security Council’s response to the Syrian 
crisis, which is used here to advance the central argument in another way.  It demonstrates how a 
failure to maintain an international consensus on the procedural question of who should decide 
how international society meets its new responsibility can, to paraphrase Beetham again, affect 
the quality of the P3’s performance.  This was particularly apparent during the Syrian crisis of 
August/September 2013 when the public and parliaments of the P3 states of the demonstrated a 
reluctance and even (in he UK case) an unwillingness to intervene.     
The argument that regime change had become the West’s policy and that the ‘civilian-protection 
mandate of R2P was its cover’ lent credence to the views of those who had long been critical of 
the concept.46  The concern that R2P would be a ‘trojan horse’ to notionally legitimise the 
intervention of states with ulterior motives was well known within academic circles.47 It took on a 
new significance during the Libya intervention when the BRICS states and their supporters gave 
voice to exactly that complaint.  South Africa perhaps articulated the concern best in a debate on 
the protection of civilians in May 2011.  It noted how ‘the pursuit of political agendas that go 
beyond the protection of civilian mandates ...will undermine the gains made in this discourse and 
provide ammunition to those who have always been sceptical of the concept’.48    
This was echoed several months later by Guatemala’s permanent representative to the United 
Nations. Noting that Guatemala had expressed similar concerns during the 63rd Session of the 
General Assembly in July of 2009 he argued that these had now 
multiplied exponentially on the heels of the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1973 (2011), which, in the eyes of the sceptics, came to confirm their 
worst fears, in the sense that invoking the protection of civilians was just a new 
pretext to meet darker objectives, such as intervening by force to overthrow a 
regime. For some countries, the execution of resolution 1973 (2011) has been 
traumatic, and it must be recognized that its implementation has poisoned the 
environment regarding the “responsibility to protect”, to the point that it is 
compromising the important progress achieved regarding its acceptance and 
implementation between 2005 and the present (Rosenthal: 2012).  
The issue here then was not the substantive value of civilian protection (no one defended Libya’s 
right to commit or ignore atrocities), rather the concern was a procedural one and that centred on 
the P3’s claim they could decide how best to implement the mandate.  From the P3 perspective 
regime change was the best way to protect civilians but that was not how their opponents 
interpreted Resolution 1973.  This failure to maintain a consensus on how the POC mandate was 
to be implemented, and the insistence that intervention would continue regardless of these 
                                                          
46 (Reiff: 2011 
47 also Chandler 2004; McCormack 2010). 
48 (United Nations: 2011a, 18; see also United Nations: 2011b, 22-3) 
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concerns, meant the P3 have had to shoulder considerable legitimacy costs.  But again these 
might be balanced by the claim that the P3 delivered outcomes that were consistent with the 
substantive values of international society.  These kinds of arguments draw on counterfactual 
evidence informed by the experience in Bosnia.  Had the P3 limited the military operation 
because they were too concerned about influencing the politics of another nation it would have 
left ‘safe areas’ vulnerable to attack.  As Christian Turner of the UK Foreign Office put it, the 
Free Libya forces were not systematically targeting civilian populations in the way pro-Gaddafi 
forces were. So although the intention of the POC mandate was to remain politically neutral the 
consequence was inevitably a weakening of the regime’s forces and command and control 
facilities.  Had the Free Libya force been causing widespread civilian casualties, Turner added ‘we 
would absolutely be responding to that’.49   From this perspective there was no other way to 
implement what the Security Council had mandated and the objections of those not leading the 
coalition were unreasonable and to be dismissed on those grounds.50 
There is however another aspect to the way the P3 responded to the emergence of this particular 
faultline and this too reflects on the central argument of the paper.  Although the P3 have solid 
grounds for claiming their intervention delivered a positive outcome in terms of the protection of 
civilians mandate, there were legitimacy costs to breakdown of international consensus; and, 
crucially, this has had a negative effect on (to paraphrase Beetham again) the quality of 
international society’s performance in other R2P situations. This is captured in the following 
explanation Russia gave for vetoing a Security Council resolution condemning the Assad regime 
in Syria.  It directly linked its veto back to the NATO-led action in Libya.   
Our proposal for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military 
intervention were not taken into account, and based on the well-know events in 
North Africa, that can only put us on our guard. ... The situation in Syria cannot 
be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience ... For us 
members of the United Nations, it is very important to know how the resolution 
was implemented and how a Security Council resolution turned into its opposite.51  
 It is possible of course that the Russians would have taken such a position regardless of the way 
the P3 conducted the Libya operation.  It was closer to the Assad regime than it was to the 
Gaddafi regime and its particular interests were clearer.  Yet as a stand against what it claimed 
were irresponsible military interventions by the unaccountable P3 Russia’s position attracted the 
support of China who joined it in vetoing Security Council resolutions relating to Syria.  This was 
                                                          
49 Oral Evidence at the Defence Committee, 12 October 2011 at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc950-ii/uc95001.htm 
50 See conclusion of the UK’s Defence Committee Ninth Report of 2010-12, Operations in Libya 25 January 2012, p.7.  
51 (United Nations: 2011c, 4). 
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noted by the Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian State Duma, 
Alexey Pushkov. 
The immediate reason for this cooperation between Russia and China was the 
Libyan War. Then in 2011, both Moscow and China abstained on Resolution 
1973, and it turned out this resolution was given such a broad reading that it 
almost became the opposite of what was intended. This resolution was taken as a 
green light for a war by the use of air power and missiles against Libya. The result 
was that both Russia and China reconsidered their stand on Libya, and decided 
not to give UN legitimacy to another war of this kind.  Thus, China and Russia 
share the same concept: the world should not be unipolar, because unipolarity 
leads to wars.52 
As with the ICC case then, we have a situation where a procedural disagreement (this time 
centred on who should decide how best to implement a Security Council mandate to use force) 
has rebounded on the P3 in ways that have made it more difficult to achieve their substantive 
aim, the protection of civilian populations (this time in Syria).  The argument may be made that 
the P3 had no intention of intervening in the Syrian conflict and that the legitimacy costs 
incurred by the Libya intervention were therefore inconsequential.  But this response confuses 
R2P with military intervention. The P3 were clearly reluctant to intervene militarily in the Syrian 
conflict but to the extent Russian and Chinese opposition has impacted on the ability of the 
international community to coordinate a diplomatic effort on Syria it illustrates how suspicion of 
the P3’s approach has impacted negatively on the quality of international society’s response to the 
crisis.    
 
Conclusion.  
There is a danger of the P3 states resting on the laurels of the Libya operation and consoling 
themselves with the argument that nothing could have been done to save the people of Syria. 
Yet the Libyan operation could have been more sensitive to the benefits of maintaining the 
consensus underpinning R2P and this could have been mobilised more effectively to stabilise the 
Syrian situation.  The argument that the Libyan operation was not handled well is not limited to 
the BRICS and their supporters.  Those closely associated with the development of R2P have 
been critical of the way the P3 implemented it in Libya.  For instance, Gareth Evans writes that 
the US, Britain, and France may have reasonable arguments that justify their actions but they did 
not give other Security Council members ‘sufficient information to enable them to be evaluated’.  
                                                          
52 Interview in Nation Interest 19 June 2013 at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/behind-russias-syria-stance-
8623?page=2 
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This left many states, in particular the BRICS (all of whom were sitting on the Security Council) 
feeling ‘bruised’ and expressing their belief that ‘if better process [had] been followed, more 
common ground could have been achieved’.53  
In that context, responsibility for the failings of the Security Council on Syria does not rest 
exclusively on Russian shoulders.  The P3 managed to sell the Libyan operation to the Security 
Council but they did not prevent what has been compared to ‘buyer’s remorse’.54 The use of this 
phrase makes it sound as if responsibility for the international dissonance rests entirely with 
Russia but that misses a crucial point. The legitimation of power does not require consensus but 
a consensus that helps to bestow legitimacy makes the exercise power easier.  The failure to 
maintain consensus over Libya made international society’s challenge in Syria more difficult.      
This is crucial to understand if international society is to improve its performance in protecting 
civilian populations from mass atrocity. This paper has demonstrated that the perceived 
legitimacy deficit in the way the P3 has implemented protection of civilian mandate and the way 
the Security Council is seen to control the process of international criminal justice has made the 
task of implementing R2P more difficult.  The danger here is that the P3 state that is willing to 
meet its responsibilities could find itself caught in a vicious circle.  If the only way of justifying 
the exclusionary decision making process at the core of R2P is to insist that this is the best way 
to deliver desirable outcomes they the P3 state risks assuming burdens that are beyond its 
material and political capacities.  There is clearly little willingness to intervene in African 
countries to arrest those indicted by the court and, as the reaction to Assad’s alleged use of 
chemical weapons demonstrates, there is little appetite for further military intervention.  The 
more likely scenario is that R2P will continue to lose credibility as those with the sense of 
exclusion maintain policies non-cooperation and the P3 begin to realise that they alone cannot 
bear the burden of liberal hegemony. 
The alternative of course is to reform the procedures relating to the question of who decides 
how international society should meet its responsibility to protect and prosecute.  The Brazilian 
initiative, Responsibility while Protecting can be interpreted as a positive development in this respect.  
It sought to establish guidelines for intervening states.  These  
must be observed throughout the entire length of the authorization, from the 
adoption of the resolution to the suspension of the authorization by a new 
resolution; ... [e]nhanced Security Council procedures are needed to monitor and 
assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure 
                                                          
53 Gareth Evans on 'Responsibility to Protect' after Libya. Interview with Gareth Evans by Alan Philips for The 
World Today, Chatham House, October 2012 at http://www.gevans.org/opeds/oped132.html 
54 Jenifer Welsh ‘What a Difference a Year Makes’ 5 February 2012 at  http://opencanada.org/features/syria-un/ 
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responsibility while protecting; ...[t]he Security Council must ensure the 
accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force.55     
We see here not a rejection of the R2P principle but a recognition that those using force in its 
name have a responsibility to social constituencies of legitimation beyond themselves; and while 
some have argued that this kind of initiative complicates the intervener’s task of delivering 
substantively legitimate outcomes, the evidence presented here demonstrates that a concern for 
procedural legitimacy is important for achieving the long term goal of preventing and stopping 
mass atrocity.56  It is difficult, but the intervening state must look beyond the specific emergency 
that is occupying them at that time and consider the long term consequences of any intervention 
for international society.  It is ultimately in the liberal hegemon’s own interests that it encourages 
others to cooperate with it on the implementation of R2P and this can be done by democratising 
the decision-making process. 
Ideas for reforming the exclusionary procedures relating to international criminal justice have 
also been tabled.  In November 2009, for instance, states met in The Hague for the Eighth 
meeting of the Assembly of State Parties.  At that meeting African state parties, represented by 
South Africa, proposed an amendment to the Rome Statute that would empower the UN 
General Assembly to act should the Security Council fail to act on a deferral request after six 
months.57  This has echoes of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was part of the original 
ICISS conception of RtoP.  Implicit in these proposals is the idea that the General Assembly is 
more representative of international society as a whole.  A decision on when to authorise force 
or defer an investigation thus carries more legitimacy if it is made by that body.58  As Jalloh, 
Akande and du Plessis point out the South African proposal raises difficult legal questions but 
                                                          
55  (United Nations: 2011d) For a related development see the S5 (Jordan, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Singapore and 
Switzerland) draft resolution presented to the General Assembly on 4 April 2012.  It emphasized ‘the need for 
further measures to ensure the accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness of the work of the 
Security Council,, with a view to strengthening its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its 
decisions’ (Hansen 2012; Emch 2012a).  The resolution, which included the recommendation that permanent 
members refrain from using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, was withdrawn the following month mainly because of the ‘pressure exerted by the 
powerful five permanent members of the council’ (Emch 2012b).  
56 For the argument that RwP could complicate the intervener’s task and make them more reluctant to commit see 
the comments made by Australia’s Ambassador Quinlan. ‘On a possible monitoring mechanism, we are open to 
exploring how the Security Council can ensure its members are properly informed about and able to debate all 
relevant issues regarding a military mandate. We see this as crucial to maintain the ongoing legitimacy of any Council 
authorised action. Existing reporting mechanisms in the Council may need to be strengthened, for example through 
the availability of more detailed military briefing to members.’  Yet he added ‘The Council should not, of course, be 
in the business of micromanaging military operations, but if there are sound answers to concerns of Council  
members, they should be made available’. Quinlan Gary (2011) Responsibility while Protecting Statement by H.E. 
Mr Gary Quinlan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations 21 February at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Australia%2021%20Feb%20RwP.pdf 
57 (Jalloh et.al: 2011, 26-37).   
58 (Jalloh et.al.: 2011, 37).   
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that should not be an obstacle to tackling the underlying legitimacy deficit.59  Their conclusion 
reinforces the argument of this paper, which is that there are significant pragmatic reasons why 
R2P advocates should push for procedural reform. A ‘strong, independent and successful ICC 
is’, they argue, ‘in Africa's best interest as the continent works to face down the beast of 
impunity. By the same token ... it is equally in the long-term interest of the Court to show greater 
sensitivity towards the specific interests and views of African States’.60 
What is the implication of the P3 ignoring the concerns of the excluded and resisting any 
proposal for reform?  Three implications have already been mentioned.  The task of meeting the 
demands of the liberal conscience will become more difficult, the P3 will potentially exhaust 
themselves in trying to meet those demands and R2P will be reduced to being another yet 
another “utopian” idea that failed once it was confronted by the ‘realities’ of international 
politics.  There is a fourth implication.  Unable to argue that exclusionary processes enable 
desirable outcomes, the P3 will have to find other arguments to legitimise their place in the 
current hierarchy of states.  The danger of course is that they will fall back on ‘tradition’ or a 
sense that somehow the existing order is ‘natural’.61  Attempts to legitimise power on either of 
these grounds could not be described as liberal and the double standards of any such claim 
would be easily exposed.  It would be hard to avoid the conclusion in this circumstance that the 
P3 would be defending the existing order not out of fidelity to the common good but because 
they were exploiting their status for their own interests and/or because they remained wedded to 
particular conceptions of the self.  If this was the case, then defence of the existing order would 
not be the policy of a good international citizen.   
 
                                                          
59 (Jalloh et. al.: 2011, 29-35) The legal issues centre on the relationship between the General Assembly and the 
Security Council and whether an amendment to the Rome Statute could change that relationship, which is after all 
regulated by the UN Charter.  It is also difficult to envisage such an amendment being approved, particularly 
because it requires 7/8ths of state parties to would have to vote for it (Jalloh et.al. 2011, 11, 35-7). 
60 (Jalloh et.al. 2011, 12).   
61 (This point inspired by Beetham, p.59) 
